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What is the role of family planning interventions on fertility, savings, human capi-
tal investment, and development? To examine this, endogenous unwanted fertility is
embedded in an otherwise standard quantity-quality overlapping generations model
of fertility and growth. The model features costly fertility control and families can
(partially) insure against a fertility risk by using costly modern contraceptives. In the
event of unexpected pregnancies, households can also opt to abort some pregnancies,
at a cost. Given the number of children born, parents decide how much education to
provide and how much to save out of their income. We fit the model to Kenyan data,
implement several family planning policies and decompose their aggregate effects.
Our results suggest that with a small government budget (say, up to 0.5 percent of
GDP), family planning interventions might be more cost-effective in improving long-
run living standards than policies that subsidise basic education.
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“Each family tries to come as close as possible to its desired number of children... Families with
excess children consume less of other goods, especially of goods that are close substitutes for the
quantity of children. Because quality seems like a relatively close substitute for quantity, families
with excess children would spend less on each child than other families with equal income and
tastes. Accordingly, an increase in contraceptive knowledge would raise the quality of children as
well as reduce their quantity.” (Becker, 1960, p. 218)
1 Introduction
What is the role of family planning interventions on fertility, savings, human capital in-
vestment, and development? Since Malthus (1798), population dynamics have been at the
core of long-run economic analysis, and recent growth models (cf., Galor and Weil, 2000)
have continued to emphasise this. A common view in economic growth theory is that
high fertility mainly reflects desired family size and that parents are able to achieve their
fertility target (cf., Barro and Becker, 1989). From this perspective, fertility changes are
driven by parents’ demand for children (e.g., quantity-quality substitution or declining
infant mortality) and supply factors, such as family-planning interventions, should have
no impact on family size. However, in reality, sometimes people want to have the children
they conceive, and sometimes they do not. Though this statement may sound rather terse,
there is evidence to back it up.1 According to Bongaarts (2016) about 39 percent of annual
developing-world pregnancies are unplanned, and roughly half of these end in induced
abortions. In fact, in some countries, there is a substantial gap between realised fertility
and wanted fertility; and this gap is also larger for relatively poorer households.2 The fact
that contraceptive methods are costly and individuals sometimes resort to abortions in or-
der to control their family sizes corroborates this idea. In sum, there seems to be a random
aspect to fertility.3
When parents have children, a natural step that follows is to provide them with care
and education. Needless to say, while children bring a variety of inestimable benefits to
parents, they are costly both in terms of goods and time. For instance, education costs
money: tuition fees, books, transportation, and foregone wages that could come from
child labor. Education and childrearing are also costly in terms of time (e.g., parents take
care of their children when they are sick).
When added together, the statements in the previous two paragraphs (i.e., the ran-
domness of fertility and the cost of child care and education) imply that the educational
attainment of children in practice may not be as high as in a situation in which parents
1We provide detailed empirical facts on this issue in Section 3.
2Wanted fertility is defined as the age-specific hypothetical fertility under the condition that all women’s
fertility preferences were perfectly realised.
3In a time when modern contraceptive methods were not available Malthus (1798) stated that “the pas-
sion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state” and the population would
grow if it was not checked by the scarcity of food and its consequences, such as infectious diseases; or by
voluntary restraint, such as abstaining from early marriages (cf., Voigtländer and Voth, 2013). Dasgupta
(2000) argues that except under conditions of extreme nutritional stress, nutritional status does not appear
to affect fecundity.
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could perfectly control their fertility. In the aggregate, this may imply that human capi-
tal may be lower due to the randomness of family size. In addition, if poor households
have lower control of their family size, this can lead to more heterogeneity in fertility with
consequences on the level and persistence of inequality in education and income.4 This
could also have an effect on a country’s production output since workers will have lower
skills. The natural question is whether or not such effects are important and how family
planning interventions affect the fertility gap.5 This paper addresses these questions.
Although the ability to control family size is present even in primitive societies through
abortion, infanticide, and other practices, and some very effective contraceptive methods
have been available for more than 100 years (cf., Himes, 1936), there still exists a gap
between realised and desired fertility in developing countries. This gap is negatively cor-
related with income (see Tables A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix). For instance, the
proportion of women with unmet need for contraception could be as high as 40 percent in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (cf., The World Bank, 2010) and it is in general higher
for low income households.6 The empirical evidence also shows that there exists a sig-
nificant negative relationship between the fertility gap and educational attainment across
countries. That is, when fertility is closer to its desired level, educational attainment is
higher. Moreover the fertility gap is lower in countries where contraceptive use is more
widespread. This last correlation holds even when country-fixed effects, which control
for main religion and other cultural factors, and the level of development are taken into
account (see Table 1). The negative relationship between contraceptive use and unwanted
fertility is also observed using individual level data for women in Kenya (see Table 3).
We develop a general macroeconomic equilibrium model to assess the role of family
planning interventions on development. The model economy is populated by overlap-
ping generations. Households make a consumption and savings decision and imperfectly
choose how many (quantity) children they want to have (demand factors). However,
households may have more pregnancies than desired due to unexpected fertility shocks.
Families can partially insure against this fertility risk by using costly contraception (sup-
ply factors). In the event of unexpected pregnancies, households can opt to abort some
of them, but abortion is costly. Given the number of children born, parents decide how
much (quality) education to provide them. In our model, the fertility gap is consequence
of a series of factors such access to modern contraceptives, abortion law and social norms,
which map into utility costs of abortion and use of modern contraceptives. Schooling is
costly in terms of consumption goods and children rearing is costly in terms of time. These
4Using Quebec data from the 16th to the 18th century, Galor and Klemp (2015) explore the absence of
reliable contraceptives in the determination of fertility to show that moderate fecundity and thus predispo-
sition towards investment in child quality was conducive to long-run reproductive success, reflecting the
negative effect of higher fecundity on the education of each offspring.
5Family planning interventions may be justified even when the overall fertility rate is below the replace-
ment rate, but when some households have a fertility rate above their desired level.
6The median of unmet need for contraception for developing countries is 22 percent. Unmet need for
contraception is defined (cf., The World Bank, 2010) as the “proportion of currently married women who do
not want any more children but are not using any form of family planning or currently married women who
want to postpone their next birth for two years but are not using any form of family planning”.
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features allow us to map indicators (e.g., the contraceptive prevalence rate, abortion rate,
unwanted fertility, and unmet need for family planning) of reproductive behaviour from
the data into the model and to study different family planning interventions. On the pro-
duction side of the economy, there is a standard representative firm which uses labor and
capital as inputs to produce final goods. We solve for a stationary equilibrium.
The model parameters are fitted to match statistical moments for the Kenyan economy,
a country in which the average fertility gap is 1.2 children, which is above the average
(0.87) for all developing countries in our dataset. The average gap hides important hetero-
geneity since the gap between realised and wanted fertility is approximately 2 children for
parents with a primary degree and 0.6 for parents with more than 12 years of schooling.
In the baseline economy there is substantial heterogeneity in education and income. We
are able to replicate the fertility pattern (levels and heterogeneity) and the gap between
realised and wanted fertility observed in the data. We show that the way in which family
planning policies affect fertility in our model is consistent with the estimates reported in
the microeconometric literature, which gives us confidence to further explore the impacts
of such policies on the economy. We then assess the importance of family-planning in-
terventions on education, inequality, and income per capita. Counterfactual exercises are
implemented to shed some light on the quantitative importance of contraception use. For
instance, in a world without fertility risk (i.e. with no unwanted pregnancies), educational
attainment would be higher by about 1.1 extra year of education. Together with a rise in
the capital stock, this leads to a hike in income per capita of about 13 percent. We also
investigate several policies commonly used, including policies targeted at the poor. We
show that given a small government budget (say 0.5 percent of GDP), family planning
interventions (e.g., subsidising the price of modern contraceptives) are more cost-effective
in improving living standards than policies that subsidise education.
We decompose the effect of family planning interventions on the economy into three
channels: a general equilibrium effect due to price movements, a wanted fertility channel
since desired fertility may change with policies, and the response of parents investment in
education of their children. We show that to fully understand the effects of family plan-
ning policies on individual outcomes it is important to perceive the response of house-
holds in terms of desired fertility to each policy, as well as the interaction of this response
with households investment decisions. Families target a higher wanted fertility rate when
the fertility risk of unwanted pregnancies is reduced. This can mitigate some of the effects
of family planning policies on reproductive behaviour, investment, and income levels.
The remainder of this paper is divided into six additional sections. The next section de-
scribes the related literature on the topic and places our contribution. Some empirical facts
are documented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the model economy, which is used for
quantitative analysis. Section 5 fits model parameters to the data, and Section 6 provides
the quantitative analysis to measure the aggregate effects of family planning interventions
on development. Section 7 contains concluding remarks. There is also a companion Online
Appendix with the description of the data and some robustness exercises.7
7The Online Appendix can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/czrsantos/research.
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2 Related Literature
Our research is related to a literature on the relationship between fertility and develop-
ment. Most of the papers in this literature focus on the joint evolution of economic and
demographic processes (cf., Barro and Becker, 1989; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Galor
and Weil, 2000) represented by a negative relationship between fertility and income.8 The
main idea is that when income rises the opportunity cost of raising children rises and par-
ents decrease their family size and invest more in each child. This is the quantity-quality
trade-off, which depends on the income elasticity of the quantity and quality of children,
postulated and explained intuitively by Becker (1960), which has been the dominant the-
oretical framework in the economics of fertility over the past decades (cf., Doepke, 2015).
Economists have used this framework to understand the dynamics of economic develop-
ment and whether or not fertility choice can help to explain such dynamics.9 Becker (1960)
does discuss in detail the importance of contraceptive methods in controlling family size,
but birth control techniques are not mentioned in his subsequent work (cf., Barro and
Becker, 1989; Becker and Lewis, 1973).10 Our interpretation is that the discussion of most
of these articles focus on fertility in developed countries, such as the United States, where
these contraceptive methods are affordable and readily available to the public. In addition,
there is public awareness about their effectiveness in controlling pregnancies, and there-
fore the realised number of children is very close to the desired one. Our view is that this
might not be the case for some developing countries, and this seems to be backed by the
empirical evidence. In developing countries even when contraceptives can be obtained at
low cost in public clinics, for example, they are often stocked out (cf., Ashraf, Field, and
Lee, 2014). To the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to consider explicitly fertility
shocks, costly contraception choice, and abortion in a model of growth and development
with endogenous population growth, and to investigate the aggregate effects of family
planning interventions.11 Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2016) also consider unwanted
fertility by assuming that a share of couples cannot control fertility, but this differs from
our approach since we assume that fertility control is costly, and the lack of ability to per-
fectly control pregnancies is derived from economic incentives. They investigate a family
8Our model can generate a negative correlation between fertility and income even when the desired
family size is constant. This can happen because as income rises, modern contraceptive methods become
relatively cheaper and the gap between realised and wanted fertility decreases.
9See, for instance, de la Croix and Doepke (2003) and Vogl (2016).
10Doepke (2015) states that “In the sense that the lack of knowledge of birth control among poorer house-
holds is assumed rather than derived from economic incentives, Becker’s 1960 paper does not yet go all the
way in founding fertility choice in economics.” We provide economic foundation for that based on costly
contraceptives and we show that this may be quantitatively important in some developing countries.
11Strulik (2017) also considers costly contraception in a model of growth. He abstracts from fertility shocks
and heterogeneity among households, while we explore such dimensions. He focuses on the role of modern
contraceptives in the fertility transition, and we concentrate on the impact of family planning interventions
on individual and aggregate outcomes. The role of modern contraceptives in the fertility transition is also
studied by Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2017). In a recent article, de Silva and Tenreyro (2019) investigates
the role of changes in social norms in the fertility transition and how population policies might have changed
such norms. On this, see also Beach and Hanlon (2019). We see our paper complementary to theirs.
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planning policy which sets the percentage of couples able to control their fertility to one.
Ashraf, Weil, and Wilde (2013) also study the effects of policies which reduce fertility on
investment and output per capita. Fertility is exogenous in their framework, and they
feed different population paths into a growth model to asses the impact of each on output
dynamics.
Our general idea relies on the assumption that family planning interventions have a
first-order effect on fertility decisions. There is a bulk of evidence supporting this.12 For
instance, Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay (2009) show that removing legal restrictions
on abortion significantly reduces fertility and that this has a positive impact on female
labor force participation. Using an experiment in Zambia, Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014)
show that the local average treatment effect estimation implies that use of family planning
services during about two years of the experiment was associated with a 27 percent re-
duction in births. Using variation in the timing and location of the Profamilia program in
Colombia, Miller (2010) finds that availability of modern contraceptives allowed women
to postpone their first birth and to have about 5 percent fewer children in their lifetime.
Our model helps to rationalise these findings since we integrate demand and supply
factors in the determination of fertility, which is not possible in a standard quantity-quality
fertility model. This paper therefore provides a bridge between the macro literature on
fertility and growth and the empirical micro literature on family planning interventions,
fertility, and human capital outcomes. In addition, with our framework it is possible to
run and to evaluate a variety of counterfactual policies, not necessarily available in control
trial experiments, and to disentangle different channels, such as the importance of general
equilibrium effects. Therefore, we believe our paper is an important contribution to the
literature on family planning policy and development, filling an existing gap with far-
reaching implications for policies.
3 Facts
In this section we describe some macro (Subsection 3.1) and micro (Subsection 3.2) empir-
ical facts which motivate our work.
3.1 Cross-Country Facts
Table 1 shows the regression results in which the dependent variable is the gap between
actual and wanted fertility, and the explanatory variable of interest is the percentage of
women who have ever used modern contraceptive methods.13 We have an unbalanced
panel since the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) from USAID, which contain infor-
mation on the fertility gap and contraceptive use across countries, are implemented in
12Subsection 5.3 summarises some studies on the effects of family planning policies on fertility. See also
de Silva and Tenreyro (2017).
13The descriptions of all data sources, definition of the variables, summary statistics, and simple correla-
tions are reported in the companion Online Appendix.
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Table 1: Relationship between unwanted fertility and the use of modern contraceptive methods - Cross
country Analysis.
Dependent variable: Unwanted fertility (fertility gap)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% of women who ever used -0.0015 −0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0048 -0.0057 −0.0136∗∗∗ −0.0089∗
modern contr. methods (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0046)
Log of per capita GDP -0.0134 -0.0153 0.0499 -0.0906 0.0014 0.1070
(0.0641) (0.1544) (0.1761) (0.0583) (0.1620) (0.1684)
Wanted fertility −0.1203∗ -0.1177 −0.2188∗∗
(0.0738) (0.0994) (0.0924)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Number of observations 203 203 203 203 203 203
Number of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
R-squared 0.0084 0.8550 0.8616 0.0546 0.8590 0.8727
Notes: Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ imply that
coefficients are statistically different from zero at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively.
countries on different dates. There are 85 countries in total, but they appear in the sam-
ple in different frequencies and in years ranging from 1985 to 2013.14 We do not aim to
provide a causal effect of modern contraceptive use on the fertility gap, instead we just
provide an association between these variables.
Column (1) of Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients when we regress the fertil-
ity gap on the logarithm of per capita income and the percentage of women who have
ever used modern contraceptive methods. As we can see, there is a negative association
between unwanted fertility and the measure of modern contraceptive use, but this corre-
lation is not statistically different from zero at the usual confidence levels. This negative
correlation becomes statistically significant once we introduce country fixed effects, which
control for time invariant effects such as legal origin, main religion, and other cultural fac-
tors. Country fixed effects substantially increase the explanation of the observed variation
in the fertility gap. According to the specification in Column (2) the gap between realised
and wanted fertility is significantly lower in countries where contraceptive use is more
widespread. Column (3) regression contains the same explanatory variables as the one in
Column (2) but we also introduce dummies for each decade.15 The correlation between
the fertility gap and the percentage of women who have ever used modern contraceptive
14Some variables have missing observations and our final sample has 80 countries and 203 observations.
15We do not control for time dummies because some countries (19 in total) appear only once in the sample.
We also do not control for the DHS phase fixed effects because few countries appear more than once in each
phase. We observe only 5 cases in which a country appears more than once in a DHS phase.
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Table 2: Relationship between human capital attainment and fertility (unwanted and wanted) - Cross coun-
try analysis.
Dependent variable: Human capital attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unwanted fertility −1.1400∗∗ −1.2715∗∗∗ −0.6264∗∗∗ −0.5891∗∗∗ −0.6078∗∗∗
(0.4516) (0.2058) (0.1878) (0.2216) (0.1904)
Wanted fertility −1.3035∗∗∗ −1.1685∗∗∗ −0.5063∗∗∗ −0.4897∗∗∗
(0.1384) (0.1249) (0.1239) (0.1219)
Log of per capita GDP 0.4506 0.3408
(0.3323) (0.3233)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 201 201 201 201 201
Number of countries 71 71 71 71 71
R-squared 0.5634 0.9752 0.9882 0.9864 0.9884
Notes: Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ imply that
coefficients are statistically different from zero at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively.
methods is weaker and not statistically different from zero at the usual confidence levels.
In Columns (4)–(6) of Table 1 we also add wanted fertility as an explanatory variable.
The fertility gap decreases with wanted fertility, and the negative association between
the fertility gap and the percentage of women who have ever used modern contracep-
tive methods becomes stronger. This correlation is statistically different from zero at a
99 percent confidence level once wanted fertility and country fixed effects are controlled
in the regressions, which contradicts earlier results by Pritchett (1994).16 The most com-
plete specification, which is our preferred one, explains about 87 percent of the observed
variation in unwanted fertility.
Table 2 reports coefficients of regressions of human capital attainment, measured by
the average years of schooling of the total adult population, on unwanted fertility for dif-
ferent specifications.17 In all regressions there exists a significant negative relationship be-
tween the fertility gap and educational attainment across countries. That is, when fertility
is closer to its desired level, educational attainment is higher. This correlation is negative
and significant even after including country fixed effects, decade dummies, and control-
ling for per capita income and wanted fertility. Unwanted and wanted fertility explain
approximately 56 percent of the variation in education attainment in the sample, visible
in Column (1). Educational attainment is also negatively correlated with wanted fertility,
16Clearly, our sample period is different from his, which might explain the difference.
17Missing observations in the human capital variable explain the difference in sample size between the
regressions in Table 1 and Table 2.
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Table 3: Relationship between unwanted fertility and the use of modern contraceptive methods - Kenyan
individual level data.
Dependent variable: Unwanted fertility (fertility gap)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ever used modern contrac −0.5128∗∗∗ −0.2462∗∗ −0.05072∗∗∗ −0.2185∗∗ −0.1997∗
methods (0.1004) (0.0975) (0.0962) (0.0938) (0.1093)
Wanted fertility −0.3917∗∗∗ −0.4851∗∗∗ −0.5159∗∗∗
(0.0254) (0.0240) (0.0263)
Completed primary −0.2445∗∗ −0.2833∗∗
education (0.1041) (0.1133)
Completed secondary −1.8610∗∗∗ −1.3501∗∗∗
education (0.1361) (0.1440)
Completed higher −2.8633∗∗∗ −1.9356∗∗∗
education (0.2066) (0.2124)
DHS phase dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No No No Yes
Number of observations 4,205 4,205 4,203 4,203 3,430
R-squared 0.0106 0.0728 0.1447 0.2222 0.2942
Notes: Other controls include: Indicator for household wealth index in quintiles; Religion indicators, rural
dummy and indicators for knowledge of contraceptive methods. Standard errors clustered by region of
residence are in parentheses. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ imply that coefficients are statistically different from
zero at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively.
which reflects the quantity-quality trade-off. The negative association between unwanted
fertility and human capital attainment will be one of the main endogenous mechanisms of
how family planning interventions affect economic development in our theory.
3.2 Micro-level Evidence from Kenya
Using individual level data from five DHS surveys (1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008-09) for
Kenya, we also explore time and individual cross-sectional variations on how the use of
modern contraceptives is associated with unwanted fertility at the household level.18
In Table 3 we regress the fertility gap of all 40 year or older women on the variable “ever
use of modern contraceptives” and a set of other controls. As we can observe on Columns
(1) to (5) in Table 3, there is a negative and statistically significant correlation between
the ever use of modern contraceptives and the unwanted fertility for 40 year and older
18There is also the 2014 DHS Survey for Kenya, but observations on the variable “ever use of modern
contraceptives” are missing.
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women in Kenya. In all regressions, the correlation is statistically different from zero at 90
percent confidence level. This is true even in our full specification, which includes controls
for educational attainment (the dummy left out was the no education degree indicator),
DHS phase fixed effects, indicators for the individual wealth quintile, religion dummies,
rural dummy and indicators about knowledge of contraceptive methods.19 Notice also
the negative relationship between educational attainment and the fertility gap. According
to the full specification, women with a higher degree have on average 2 fewer unwanted
children than women without an education degree.20
Therefore what the reduced form evidence shows is that there might be a positive rela-
tionship between contraception use and education, via the reduction in the gap between
actual and wanted fertility levels. This is a mechanism that we explore in our equilibrium
model below to understand how family planning interventions affect individual decisions
and aggregate outcomes.
4 Model
4.1 Demographics and Endowments
The economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals who live for three peri-
ods: childhood, young adulthood, and old adulthood. Children do not make any eco-
nomic decisions and can acquire skills. Young adults are organised as couples and make
the following economic choices: their desired number of children and the intensity of their
contraceptive use. The number of pregnancies is stochastic, and the realised and desired
number of pregnancies may be different. The use of contraception can lower the chances
of an unwanted pregnancy. Once the number of pregnancies is realised, young couples
may decide to abort some of them to close the fertility gap. Abortion is costly, both in
terms of utility and in income. Young adults have one unit of productive time and are
endowed with skills that they acquired during their childhood. They then invest their in-
come into the education of their children, consume, and save. Old adults do not work and
simply consume their savings.
4.2 Production
The consumption good is produced with a technology that uses capital, K, and efficiency
units of labour, L, as inputs. The technology is represented by:21
Y = AKαL1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), A > 0. (1)
19In Subsection A.2 of the companion Online Appendix (Tables A6 and A7), we show that the results of
Table 3 are also robust conditional on whether or not the husband wants more children than the woman.
20Ideally we would regress the education attainment of the offspring on her mother’s unwanted fertility.
However, this is not available in the DHS.
21In order to simplify the notation we will abstract from the subscript t to denote the time period and use
the convention that object ′ stands for future variables.
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Capital depreciates fully after use.
Let w be the wage rate and let R be the rental price of capital. Profit maximisation
implies that input prices are paid according to their marginal productivity, such that:
w = (1− α)AKαL−α, (2)
R = αAKα−1L1−α. (3)
4.3 Households
Desired and realised fertility: Young couples first decide on the number of children that
they want to have, ñ.22 Then, the number of pregnancies, p, is realised. We assume that
p− ñ = max{η − θq, 0}, (4)
where q ≥ is the investment in contraception, η is a random variable with distribution
Γ(η) and support [0, N], and θ is a positive parameter.23 We are not saying that without
modern contraceptive methods families could not use traditional practices to control fer-
tility (e.g., extended breast-feeding and sexual abstinence). Equation (4) simply implies
that the use of modern contraceptive methods can decrease the fertility gap relative to a
situation without these birth control (supply) technologies.
Contraception is costly and the relative price of contraception is φq. This includes not
only the price to buy modern contraceptives on pharmacies or to acquire (including trans-
portation costs) them in public clinics, but also the fact that they might be stocked out.
Therefore, φq corresponds to supply factors which might affect the use of modern contra-
ceptive methods. Contraception also generates a utility cost Ψq > 0 whenever q > 0. In
some cultures, modern contraception use can be associated with promiscuity and women
may also have the fear of side effects and adverse reactions related to, for instance, the
use of pills. In addition, there may potentially be intra-household disagreement (husband
versus wife desired fertility), which is not explicitly modelled here, about the use of contra-
ceptives. For instance, Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014) show that when women receive access
to contraception alone they report lower subjective well-being than when they receive ac-
cess to contraception with their husbands, suggesting a psychosocial cost. Therefore, the
parameter Ψq > 0 corresponds to demand barriers to the use of modern contraceptive
methods. Once the number of pregnancies is realised, the household can choose to abort
some of them, a, in order to close the gap between the number of realised pregnancies and
the desired number of children. Abortion is costly both in terms of utility, such that there
are disutility costs Ψa > 0 whenever a > 0, and in terms of the consumption good. The
relative price of abortion is φa. The realised number of children is:
n = p− a. (5)
22Since adults are organised as couples, we can view ñ as the desired number of children that each house-
hold wants to have. We abstract from intra-household bargaining over fertility. Doepke and Kindermann
(2019) explore in detail the consequences of bargaining over fertility for a set of European countries.
23We could assume that instead of Equation (4), we have that p− ñ = η− θq. Then households could also
have fewer pregnancies than the desired fertility. We focus on relatively poorer countries in which we find
that on average there is a positive fertility gap for any level of parents’ human capital.
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Investment in the use of modern contraceptives is an insurance against the risk of un-
wanted pregnancies. Abortion terminates a pregnancy with certainty. Therefore, we can
see modern contraceptives as unwanted pregnancy preventives, while abortion is an ex
post treatment (cf., Kremer and Syder, 2015). Both technologies incur costs and agents
will take them into account when making their birth control choices.
Human capital: Parents invest in the education of their children, e ≥ 0, such that the
human capital of their children is equal to
h′ = εh̃(e). (6)
The function h̃(e) is increasing, differentiable, and concave with respect to e, and the price
of education in terms of the consumption good is λ(e), which varies with e. We also as-
sume that h̃(0) > 0 such that the quality of children’s income elasticity is increasing with
income, as postulated by Becker (1960) and explored by Greenwood, Seshadri, and Van-
denbroucke (2005), to generate the secular decline in fertility and the increase in human
capital. The shock ε ∼ F(ε) has positive support and summarises unobserved factors
that influence the human capital production process. Investment in education is in terms
of the consumption good. Children are also time consuming. Each child takes a fraction
χ ∈ (0, 1) of her parents time endowment and Nχ < 1.
Optimal decisions: Consumption of couples during the young adulthood period and old
adulthood period are denoted by cy and c′o, respectively. Preferences of couples are repre-
sented by the following utility function:
U(cy, c′o, n, h
′), (7)
where U(·, ·, ·, ·) is differentiable, increasing, and concave in all arguments.
Let s be the savings of a young adult couple and Ia>0 be an indicator function which
equals one when a > 0 and zero otherwise. The problem of the couple with p realised
pregnancies who invested q in contraception is to choose cy, c′o, a, s, and e to maximise
Ṽ(h, p, q) = max
cy,c′o,a,s,e≥0
{Eε[U(cy, c′o, n, εh̃(e))]−ΨaIa>0}, (8)
subject to (5), (6),
cy + s + φqq + φaa + λ(e)en = wh(1− χn), (9)
c′o = R
′s. (10)
Eε[·] corresponds to expectations over ε. Equation (9) corresponds to the budget constraint
of the young couple. It implies that consumption plus savings of the household plus
expenditures on contraception, abortion, and education must be equal to income. Budget
constraint (10) states that in old adulthood, couples consume the principal and interest
from their savings during the young adulthood period.
12
Let Iq>0 be an indicator function which equals one when q > 0 and zero otherwise. The
problem of a couple before the number of pregnancies is realised is to choose the number
of desired children, ñ, and investment in contraception, q, in order to:
V(h) = max
ñ,q≥0
{Eη[Ṽ(h, b, q)−ΨqIq>0]}, (11)
subject to Equation (4). The notation Eη[·] denotes that expectations are taken over the
stochastic number of pregnancies summarised by the random variable η.
4.4 Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, agents and firms optimally solve their problems and all mar-
kets clear. Let x = (h, η) with x ∈ X = (0, ∞)× (0, N). The couples’ optimal behaviour
defines optimal policy functions cy(x), c′o(x), s(x), q(h), a(x), e(x), and ñ(h). The sta-
tionary equilibrium in this economy is characterised by a stationary human capital dis-
tribution associated with the optimal behaviour of couples and firms. To characterise the
stationary human capital distribution, first define the following function,
1(x, ε, h′) =
{
1 if h′ = εh̃(e(x))
0 otherwise
.
The function above takes the value of one if a child coming from parents with a state x
and a shock ε builds a human capital level h′ . It takes the value of zero otherwise. Next,




which computes the probability that a child attains human capital level h′ conditional on
having parents with state x. The number of children of a household is given by
n(x) = ñ(h) + max{η − θq(h), 0} − a(x).







The distribution of human capital in the economy is Υ. The rate of population growth, g,
in this economy is given by




The law of motion for the distribution presented in Equation (12) takes into account popu-
lation growth as evidenced by the normalisation in the denominator. In this economy both
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capital and labor will grow with the rate of population growth. To define the stationary








Definition: (Stationary Competitive Equilibrium) A stationary competitive equilibrium for
this economy consists of allocations for firms {K, L}, a collection of policy functions for households
{cy(x), c′o(x), s(x), q(h), a(x), e(x), ñ(h)}, a stationary distribution Υ, a vector of prices {w, R},
and a population growth rate g such that:
i. Given the vector of prices {w, R}, the vector {K, L} solves (2) and (3).
ii. Policy functions q(h) and ñ(h) solve value function V(h) and
p− ñ(h) = max{η − θq(h), 0}.
iii. Policy functions {cy(x), c′o(x), s(x), a(x), e(x)} solve value function
Ṽ(h, b, q).
iv. Market clearing conditions are such that:
ˆ
X
















v. The distribution of human capital Υ solves (12).
vi. The population growth rate is given by (13).
5 Fitting the Model to the Data
In order to investigate the effects of family planning interventions on human capital dy-
namics, inequality, and income, we must assign values for the model parameters. We have
prior information about some parameters but other parameters are specific to the analysis
at hand and little is known about their magnitudes. Therefore, values for these param-
eters will be estimated such that the model matches key micro and macro moments of
Kenya for the late 2000s, due to data restrictions. We use a minimum distance procedure
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which targets a set of data moments on wanted and unwanted fertility and family plan-
ning in terms of contraceptives and abortion conditional on education levels. These data
moments are derived from the 2008 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey. Matching the
cross-sectional distributions of fertility and family planning conditional on human capital
ensures that the model delivers a credible link between fertility uncertainty, family plan-
ning instruments to mitigate it, and human capital accumulation. We concentrate on the
following levels of education: 0 years of schooling, 4 years of schooling, 8 years of schooling, 12
years of schooling, and 16 years of schooling. We also target several aggregate moments such
as income inequality, the consumption-output ratio, and the capital-output ratio, among
others. First, however, we need to impose functional forms for some of the expressions
of our theoretical framework. Below we describe in detail these functions and how we
calibrate and estimate model parameters.
5.1 Calibration and Estimation
Model period: The model period is assumed to be 20 years. This is consistent with the
2008–2014 average life-expectancy in Kenya of around 60 years (cf., The World Bank, 2015).
Production technology: The capital share in income we get from the Penn World Tables
(cf., Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015) and set it to α = 0.36. Capital depreciates fully af-
ter use. The productivity factor A is chosen such that total output per capita is normalised
to 1. The production technology parameters are: A and α = 0.36 (one to be estimated).




)κ, where N corresponds to the maximum number of unwanted pregnan-
cies possible. We set the maximum number of unwanted pregnancies per woman to 10. In
the grid for wanted fertility we also set the maximum number of wanted pregnancies to 10
so that a woman could have a maximum of 20 pregnancies in her lifetime. Since the model
period is 20 years, this implies one pregnancy per year. The efficiency of contraception is
determined by θq. Different combinations of parameters φq and θ lead to identical choices
of consumption and fertility. In order to resolve this issue, we normalise the price of con-
traception to one such that φq = 1. The relative price of abortion is equal to φa > 0. The
fertility technology parameters are: N = 10, φq = 1, κ, θ, and φa (three to be estimated).
Human capital function and child-rearing technology: The offsprings’ human capital
is given by h′ = εh̃(e). We assume that h̃(e) = h0 + h1eζ . The fixed component h0 im-
plies non-homothetic preferences over human capital. This feature and the time cost of
children, χ, help us generate a negative relationship between fertility and parental in-
come/education in the model.24 We restrict the choice of education to five discrete op-
tions: no education, four years, eight years, twelve years, and sixteen years. Each of
these five discrete levels bears an education cost. The vector of education costs λ(e) ∈
{0, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4} summarises the amount of consumption goods parents need to forgo in
order to finance the education of a child to one of these five levels. The unobserved ability
24See Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005) and Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2010).
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that augments the human capital production, ε, is assumed to have a log-normal distribu-
tion with mean 0 such that ln ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε ). There is also the time cost of raising a child, χ.
The parameters for this section are: χ, h0, h1, ζ, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, and σ2ε (nine to be estimated).
Utility: Turning to preferences, the utility function takes the following functional form:
U(cy, c′o, n, h̃(e)) = log(cy) + β log(c
′
o) + γ log(n) + ξ log(h̃(e)).
There are also two costs related to the household’s taste: the disutility of contraception use
and abortions. Recall that these were defined as ΨqIq>0 and ΨaIa>0 with Ψq > 0 and Ψa >
0, where Iq>0 and Ia>0 are indicator functions when the use of modern contraceptives and
abortion are positive, respectively. That is, households pay these costs if they engage in
strictly positive use of each family planning option. Preference parameters are: β, γ, ξ, Ψq
and Ψa (five to be estimated).
There are therefore 18 parameters of the model to be estimated via a minimum distance
procedure. The parameters are set to match the normalisation of output per capita to one
and the following 22 data moments:
(i) Realised fertility rate and unwanted fertility rate by levels of education. Note that
matching these two series implies that the level of wanted fertility is matched too.
Source: 2008 Kenya DHS.25 [8 targets]
(ii) Abortion rates and the fraction of women using modern contraception by levels of
education. Source: 2008 Kenya DHS and own calculation based on Westoff (2008).26
[8 targets]
(iii) Fraction of people in each education category. Source: 2008 Kenya DHS. [3 targets]
(iv) Capital-output and consumption-output ratios. Source: Penn World Tables (cf., Feen-
stra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015) . [2 targets]
(v) Gini coefficient of household labor income. Source: The World Bank (2015). [1 target]
How do these data moments aid in the process of setting the model parameters? In a gen-
eral equilibrium setup a change in any parameter affects all targets. However, some sets
of data moments are more sensitive to certain parameters. The fertility and family plan-
ning targets ((i) and (ii)) conditional on human capital are useful in recovering preference
parameters {γ, ζ, Ψq, Ψa} and the price of abortion φa, as well as the fertility uncertainty
{κ}, the efficiency of modern contraceptives θ, and the time cost per child χ. To be more
25In the model there are five levels of education: no schooling, 4 years of schooling, 8 years of schooling,
12 years of schooling, and 16 years of schooling. In the DHS survey there are four levels of education: No
primary education, primary, secondary, and higher and more. Primary education in Kenya corresponds
to 8 years of schooling. Therefore, in the map from the model to the data, we aggregate the no-education
category and the 4-years-of-schooling category into one category - from 0 to 4 years of schooling.
26The total abortion rate is calculated using Equation (7) of Westoff (2008), which defines a statistical
relation of the total abortion rate with the total fertility rate and the contraceptive prevalence rate. Subsection
A1 of the Online Appendix shows precisely how the total abortion rate by education levels was calculated.
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precise, we explore the cross-sectional variation in abortion and contraception use to sep-
arately identify the preference parameters (Ψq and Ψa) and the technology parameters (θ
and φa). The idea is that preference and technology parameters will affect heterogenous
households differently. The distribution over educational categories (iii) identifies the cost
parameters {λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4}. The capital to output ratio helps to pin down the discount
factor β. Matching aggregate targets (iv) along with targets on fertility, family planning,
education, and inequality (v) help us in setting parameters for the human capital accumu-
lation process {h0, h1, σε}.
Let Θ = {β, γ, ξ, Ψq, Ψa, h0, h1, ζ, χ, σε, κ, θ, φa, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, A} be the vector of param-
eters to be estimated, and define the difference between the model-generated 22 mo-
ments and the normalisation of output to one by M(Θ), and the data moments D by
R(Θ) = D −M(Θ). The minimum distance estimation amounts to choosing parameter
values that minimize the squared form,
Θ̂ = arg min
Θ
R(Θ)′WR(Θ),
where W is a diagonal weighting matrix. We use an identity matrix in our base estimation.
Table 4 reports the calibrated and estimated parameter values that result from the baseline
estimation procedure above for Kenya.
Here are some comments on the estimated parameters. Since the model period corre-
sponds to 20 years, then a discount factor of β = 0.5952 implies that agents discount the
future at a real rate of 2.6 percent per year. Given the cost of each education level, we can
observe that the utility weight on the quality of children is higher than the utility weight on
the quantity of children. In addition, the utility cost of contraception is much smaller than
the utility cost of abortions. Also, given that the maximum number of unwanted pregnan-
cies is 10, the relative price of contraception is equal to one, and θ = 347.5306, then with
less than 3 percent of GDP it is possible to avoid any unwanted pregnancies in the model.
The time cost per child is about 3.5 percent, which is roughly half the value calibrated
by de la Croix and Doepke (2003). However, de la Croix and Doepke (2003) calibrated
this parameter for the United States economy, while our baseline economy is Kenya; we
should expect this time cost to be smaller for developing economies than for the United
States. Finally, the human capital accumulation function features a large fixed component,
h0 = 4.6612, which helps in generating the quantity-quality trade-off observed in the data.
5.2 Model Fit
Now, we discuss the fit of the model with respect to targeted and some non-targeted mo-
ments. Table 5 reports these moments in the data and in the model.
The model matches the fraction of adults in each education category very well, as seen
in Figure 1.27 Interestingly, when we run a Mincerian regression with the model generated
data to calculate the average returns to one additional year of schooling, we show that
one additional year of schooling increases on average income by 8.1 percent. Schoellman
27The average years of schooling in the model is 7.68 years, while it is 7.83 in Kenya.
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Table 4: Calibrated and estimated parameters
Parameter Description Value Comment
Calibrated parameters (3 parameters)
α Capital share in income 0.36 Feenstra et al (2015)
N Max. number of unwanted pregnancies 10 Normalised
φq Price of modern contraceptives 1 Normalised
Estimated parameters (18 parameters)
A TFP parameter 0.6602 Moments (i)-(v)
β Discount factor 0.5952 Moments (i)-(v)
γ Utility weight on fertility 0.8819 Moments (i)-(v)
ξ Utility weight on human capital 1.9252 Moments (i)-(v)
Ψq Utility cost of contraception 0.0024 Moments (i)-(v)
Ψa Utility cost of abortion 0.0804 Moments (i)-(v)
h0 Human capital - fixed 4.6612 Moments (i)-(v)
h1 Human capital - marginal 0.0349 Moments (i)-(v)
ζ Human capital - curvature 2.1145 Moments (i)-(v)
χ Time cost per child 0.0353 Moments (i)-(v)
σε Std of ability shock 0.5992 Moments (i)-(v)
κ Fertility uncertainty 0.2830 Moments (i)-(v)
θ Efficiency of contraception 347.5306 Moments (i)-(v)
φa Abortion cost 0.0033 Moments (i)-(v)
λ1 Education cost: 4 years of schooling 0.0047 Moments (i)-(v)
λ2 Education cost: 8 years of schooling 0.0093 Moments (i)-(v)
λ3 Education cost: 12 years of schooling 0.0646 Moments (i)-(v)
λ4 Education cost: 16 years of schooling 0.2392 Moments (i)-(v)
(2012) estimated the returns to schooling in Kenya to be equal to 8.3 percent. Therefore,
our model produces an average returns to schooling very close to the one observed in the
data. Consequently our model is consistent on how human capital maps onto income,
which is one of our key mechanisms of how family planning interventions might affect
individual outcomes. The model does also a good job in reproducing the pattern of mod-
ern contraceptives prevalence and the total fertility rate conditional on the level of human
capital observed in the data.28 (See Figures 2(a) and 2(c).) Therefore, the model replicates
qualitatively and quantitatively the trade-off between child quantity and quality which is
present in the empirical evidence. The model does generate, however, a lower number of
abortions than in the data for the lower tail and upper tail of the abortion distribution con-
ditional on the level of education, but observed abortions in the middle of this distribution
match well. (See Figure 2(b).) Regarding unwanted fertility, the model overestimates by
30 percent this measure for adults with no primary education and underestimates by 50
percent this measure for adults with a primary education degree. (See Figure 2(d).) Since
28The model overestimates the fertility rate at the very top of the human capital distribution.
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Adults with no primary education (%) 0.162 0.1699
Adults with 8 years of schooling (%) 0.604 0.6230
Adults with 12 years of schooling (%) 0.181 0.1571
Adults with 16 years of schooling (%) 0.053 0.0511
Fertility, parents with no primary education 6.7 6.3675
Fertility, parents with 8 years of schooling 5.5 5.5864
Fertility, parents with 12 years of schooling 4.9 4.9087
Fertility, parents with 16 years of schooling 3.1 4.2051
Unwanted fertility, parents with no primary education 0.9 1.1761
Unwanted fertility, parents with 8 years of schooling 1.8 0.9079
Unwanted fertility, parents with 12 years of schooling 1.3 0.7928
Unwanted fertility, parents with 16 years of schooling 0.6 0.5784
Abortions, parents with no primary education 1.06 0.8118
Abortions, parents with 8 years of schooling 0.68 0.7366
Abortions, parents with 12 years of schooling 0.65 0.6559
Abortions, parents with 16 years of schooling 0.97 0.6479
Modern contraceptive prevalence, parents with no primary education 0.12 0.1190
Modern contraceptive prevalence, parents with 8 years of schooling 0.348 0.3353
Modern contraceptive prevalence, parents with 12 years of schooling 0.418 0.4439
Modern contraceptive prevalence, parents with 16 years of schooling 0.521 0.5561
Income Gini 0.485 0.4788
Capital-to-output ratio, K/Y 1.57 1.3079
Consumption-to-output ratio, C/Y 0.7118 0.6644
Normalisation of output per capita to one 1 1.051
Non-targeted moments
Average returns to schooling 8.3 8.1
Unit abortion cost, % of GDP per capita 0.03-0.21 0.063
Contraception expenditure, % of GDP per capita 0.68 0.36
19
Figure 1: Data versus model - Fraction of adults by education. Source: 2008 Kenya DHS.
the fraction of adults with primary education is about 3.7 larger than the fraction of adults
with no primary education, then if anything, the model underestimates the level of un-
wanted fertility. In fact, the overall gap between realised and wanted fertility is about 1.2
children for Kenya in 2008, while in the model this gap is 0.9185. In the Online Appendix
we also fit the model to moments from Ghana (Subsection D.3) and the fit is better when
considering abortion and unwanted fertility by education. Our main conclusions derived
from our quantitative analysis for Kenya are robust to the case of the model fit to Ghana.
Regarding the aggregate measures, the model replicates fairly well the Gini index of
income and is close to reproducing the capital-to-output ratio and the consumption-to-
output ratio observed in the data. For the non-targeted statistics, the model underesti-
mates slightly the aggregate level of unwanted fertility. There are other factors affecting
unwanted fertility, such as infant mortality risks, which are not explicitly modelled in our
framework. However, given that we underestimate unwanted fertility, we should see the
effects of non-targeted family planning interventions on fertility and other outcomes as
lower bounds.29 Finally, the abortion cost30 as a fraction of per capita income generated in
the model is in the lower range of what is observed in the data. Therefore, it does not seem
29We underestimate total expenditures on modern contraceptive methods as a share of per capita GDP by
at least half of what is observed in the data. We calculate expenditures on modern contraceptives in Kenya
by using the proportion of adults adopting each method, and the commodity cost plus personal costs (ex.,
nurses and doctors) per couple year of protection of each method (cf., USAID, 2010). This gives a weighted
average of US$6.41 per year of protection or 0.68 percent of the Kenyan GDP per capita in 2008.
30Abortion in Kenya is permitted only when the life or health of the woman is in danger. Yet unsafe abor-
tion remains a leading cause of maternal morbidity and mortality in Kenya (cf., Mohamed, Izugbara, Moore,
Mutua, Kimani-Murage, Ziraba, Bankole, Singh, and Egesa, 2015). The price of abortion in Kenya ranges
from US$30-65, in illegal clinics and international charity Marie Stopes clinics (cf., Fisher, 2016; Hussain,
2012; Migiro, 2011; Robbins, 2013), to about US$200. Since a woman would abort on average one child in her
lifetime, then the effective unit cost of abortion in the model is in the range of what is observed in the data.
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(a) Contraceptive prevalence by education (b) Abortions by education
(c) Fertility by education (d) Unwanted fertility by education
Figure 2: Data versus model - Selected statistics. Source: 2008 Kenya DHS.
that we are overestimating the values for the cost of modern contraceptives and abortion
and therefore making them artificially important in our quantitative simulations on how
family planning policy affects fertility, and aggregate outcomes.
5.3 Family Planning Interventions and Fertility: Model versus Data
Before we implement family planning interventions in our baseline model, we summarise
the findings of key studies of the empirical literature, which recover the causal estimates
of the effects of family planning policies on fertility and other individual outcomes. This
is important in order to provide confidence that our family planning interventions do
not overestimate their impacts on fertility, and therefore on aggregate variables. These
interventions include subsidising the price of modern contraceptives, and programs to
change male attitudes toward family planning. Table 6 summarises five studies and Miller

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first study evaluates the impact of Profamilia, a large family planning program
in Colombia. This program was founded in 1965 in Bogota and then it was spread to
other cities in the country. Profamilia is considered a successful program in providing
modern contraceptives at subsidised rates for poor women in urban and rural areas. The
time of the launching of the program varied across counties, and this provides the source
of variation that Miller (2010) explores to show that Profamilia reduced in 5 percent the
fertility of women in their lifetime (about one-third of a child) in Colombia. According to
Miller (2010) this program costs about 6 percent of per capita GDP per birth averted.
Another famous family planning intervention is the 1977 Maternal and Child Health
and Family Planning (MCH-FP) program in the Matlab region in Bangladesh. The MCH-
FP program had home delivery of modern contraceptives, follow-up services, and general
advices to poor women in treatment villages. Maternal and child health services were
added over time. Joshi and Schultz (2013) show that the program in 1996 reduced com-
pleted fertility by 16 percent (0.78 of a child) in treatment villages when compared to con-
trol villages. The program has been criticised by its unrealistic cost since the cost per birth
averted of the program was about 120 percent of per capita GDP. However, because the
program offered a combination of family planning, maternal and child health interven-
tions, then it is not possible to attribute the effects of the program to one of its actions,
and to disentangle the cost-benefit of each component. Therefore, it is hard to compare
both the effects and the costs of the type of family planning interventions we are able to
implement in our theoretical framework with those from the MCH-FP program.
The Navrongo randomised control trial experiment in Ghana was based on the Mat-
lab experiment in Bangladesh. It was launched in 1993 and the treatment arms combined
family planning services with a variety of maternal and child health services. After five
years, the reduction in completed fertility associated with the program was about 15 per-
cent among married women (cf., Phillips, Bawah, and Binka, 2006). However, such effects
on fertility have declined over time.31 For reasons similar to those associated with the
Matlab project, it is not straightforward to compare the effects on fertility of this program
with those generated by our theoretical framework.
Kearney and Levine (2009) use state and temporal variation in the change in access (el-
igibility based on income) to family planning services in the United States through Med-
icaid to identify the causal effects of access to such services on fertility. They report an
8.9 percent reduction in completed fertility, and a cost of birth averted of about 18 per-
cent of per capita GDP.32 Bailey, Malkova, and McLaren (2017) using similar identification
strategy, find that children from families exposed to such programs had 2.8 percent higher
household incomes and were also 7 percent less likely to live in poverty. Therefore, even in
developed countries such as the United States, it seems that supply-side family planning
interventions can have sizeable effects on fertility and children’s outcome.
31See Phillips, Jackson, Bawah, MacLeod, Adongo, Baynes, and Williams (2012).
32Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, they estimate a total cost of US$6,800 per birth averted in
2001. Then using the 2001 GDP per capita in the United States, the cost as fraction of income per capita is
18 percent. As they argue, this is probably an upper bound measure, since the cost of expanding the system
was calculated by using the average cost of the program, and not the marginal cost of the existing program.
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When we improve access to modern contraceptives (decreasing the price φq) in our
model, we show that such supply-side intervention generates a reduction in fertility of
6.86-8.3 percent,33 which are consistent with the estimates reported in empirical literature
(see Table 6). The cost per birth averted is 7.21 percent of per capita GDP when general
equilibrium effects are considered, and 5.97 percent when they are not. Those numbers are
very close to those reported by Miller (2010), which evaluates a type of family planning
intervention that is close in nature to the one implemented in our counterfactual exercises.
Improving access to abortion in our model would also generate a reduction in fertility
similar to those found in the empirical literature. When general equilibrium effects are
taken into account, improvements in access to abortion reduce fertility in 5.23 percent (see
Table 8). When price effects are not considered, then the reduction in fertility is roughly
5.41 percent. Such numbers are close to the estimated effects of legalising abortion on
fertility in the United States (cf., Levine, Staiger, Kane, and Zimmerman, 1999).
Therefore, the effects of family planning policies on fertility in our model are consis-
tent with the microeconometric literature on family planning and fertility. This gives us
confidence in our quantitative exercises, which are presented in the next section.
6 Quantitative Analysis
With all parameters calibrated and estimated we can now explore how the equilibrium
properties of the model change with different family planning policies.34 Fertility is known
to be an important determinant of individual and aggregate outcomes, but little is known
about the aggregate and distributional effects of family planning policies.
6.1 Extreme Scenarios
Table 7 reports key statistics of two extreme counterfactual experiments. (See also Figure
3.) In the first (No fertility shocks) experiment we consider an economy in which households
can perfectly control family size such that we set the number of unwanted pregnancies
exogenously to zero, N = 0. There is no uncertainty in fertility and therefore no need to
use modern contraceptives (q = 0) or rely on abortion (a = 0) to control reproduction.
The theoretical framework boils down to a standard quantity-quality fertility model of
economic growth. Unwanted fertility goes down to 0 and the average fertility goes down
by about 0.4 of a child, i.e., total fertility is reduced by about 7 percent.35 This last result
confirms that aggregate fertility is quite unresponsive to changes in contraceptive access
and that the cross-country differences in fertility are mostly driven by the desired family
size (cf., Pritchett, 1994) and social norms (cf., de Silva and Tenreyro, 2019).
33Details of such intervention and others are found in Subsection 6.2.
34We also implement sensitivity analysis with respect to the 18 internally calibrated parameters, including
how the results of two counterfactual exercises are affected by local changes in each of these parameters. See
the Online Appendix C.
35May (2012) reports that family planning interventions in different countries reduced lifetime fertility
between 0.5 and 1.5 children per woman, and most estimates point to the lower end of this interval.
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The aggregate fertility measure hides important compositional differences. In this
counterfactual experiment the share of households without a primary education falls by 42
percent relative to the baseline. Figure 3(b) shows that fertility decreases for all education
levels except for the highest level (16 years of schooling). For this group fertility increases
because there are fewer resources spent on contraceptives and abortions, and agents can
target a higher wanted fertility (income effect) since there is no risk of having unwanted
pregnancies. Investment in human capital and in physical capital rise relative to the base-
line. The average number of years of schooling increases by one year,36 and the stock of
physical capital increases by 20 percent relative to the benchmark case.37 Such movements
in inputs in production increase the real wage rate by 4 percent, decrease the interest rate
by 7 percent, and increase output per capita by 13 percent relative to the baseline. Inequal-
ity decreases and most of this reduction is concentrated at the bottom of the income distri-
bution. The ratio for the 90th and 50th percentiles of income remains roughly constant, but
the ratio for the 90th and 10th percentiles of income decreases by about 13 percent relative
to the baseline. Although welfare is difficult to measure in an economy with endogenous
fertility, as explained in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007),38 we still report the average wel-
fare for the benchmark economy in each experiment. Welfare is measured simply in utils,
which implies that only an ordinal comparison can be inferred. A compensate variation
could clearly be reported, but given the problems to compare welfare in this setting we
decide to not report this variation or focus on the welfare analysis.
In order to assess the main channels driving our results, we investigate the effects of
shutting down general equilibrium effects (partial equilibrium), the wanted fertility (ex-
ogenous fertility) channel, and the education channel (exogenous education). By fixing the
interest rate at the baseline level we are considering a small open economy in which not
only the real interest rate is exogenously determined, but also (given the constant returns
to scale production function) the real wage rate. We observe that relative to the baseline
the overall results are quite similar to the case of the full counterfactual experiment in
which fertility is perfectly controlled and general equilibrium movements, which lead to
changes in the capital effective labor ratio, do not seem to drive the overall results.
In the second decomposition exercise (exogenous fertility) we impose the decision
rules for desired fertility from the baseline economy into the economy with no fertility
shocks. Notice that while households can target a higher wanted fertility rate than in the
baseline when fertility is perfectly controlled, in this counterfactual exercise we shut down
this effect. The average fertility falls by about one child (instead of 0.4 of a child) relative
to the baseline, which is similar to the decrease in unwanted fertility. Now, with artifi-
cially lower fertility, families can invest even more in physical and human capital than
when wanted fertility is also endogenous. The average number of years of schooling of
the adult population increases by 1.5 years and physical capital increases by 68 percent
36This is mainly due to the decrease in the share of adults with no primary education, which decreases by
10 percentage points. See Figure 3(a).
37De Magalhães and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2018) show that even in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is poorer
than Kenya, the wealth to income ratio grows over the life-cycle.
38We do not have a dynastic structure and it is hard to compute the welfare of those who are not born.
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Table 7: Counterfactual experiments: Extreme cases, Kenya 2008
Counterfactuals
Statistics Baseline No fertility shocks No family planning
Full Partial Exog. Exog. Full Partial Exog. Exog.
exp. equil fert. educ. exp. equil. fert. educ.
Output, input and prices
Yipc/Ybaselpc 1 1.13 1.12 1.31 1.13 0.86 0.88 0.74 1.11
Ki/Kbasel 1 1.21 1.18 1.68 1.21 0.81 0.84 0.61 1.21
Schooling (years) 7.68 8.78 8.75 9.07 8.78 6.61 6.72 6.16 7.93
wi/wbasel 1 1.04 1 1.15 1.04 0.96 1 0.89 1.05
ri/rbasel 1 0.93 1 0.78 0.93 1.07 1 1.21 0.92
Fertility and family planning
Av. fertility 5.54 5.16 5.08 4.50 5.16 6.07 6.10 6.88 5.05
Av. unw. fert. 0.92 0 0 0 0 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12
Contrac. use (% HHs) 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pregn. aborted (%) 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Av. contrac. exp./wh (%) 0.28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inequality and welfare
Gini index 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.48
Labour inc 90/50 3.83 3.89 3.88 4.05 3.89 3.56 3.69 3.44 3.44
Labour inc 90/10 12.57 10.89 10.88 10.63 10.89 10.96 10.93 9.82 12.04
Welfare 3.86 4.11 4.07 4.25 4.11 3.65 3.70 3.49 −∞
relative to the baseline. Consequently, output per capita increases by 31 percent instead of
13 percent. Therefore, understanding how targeted fertility decisions change with family
planning interventions is important to assess the full impact of these policies on individ-
ual and aggregate outcomes. In the final decomposition, we keep the policy function of
education as in the baseline and let all other margins be adjusted. We observe that relative
to the baseline, aggregate and distributional results are in equilibrium similar to when all
channels are effective, which suggests that endogenous changes in investment in educa-
tion do not seem to be driving the economic effects of family planning interventions.
The second extreme case corresponds to the situation in which there is no possibility to
control family size unless households change wanted fertility. In order to implement this
experiment in our model we simply need to make the utility cost of modern contraceptives
and abortions to be so large that it is never optimal for households to use one of those two
methods to control their fertility. Relative to the baseline, the average fertility increases by
0.54 of a child, while unwanted fertility increases from 0.92 to 2.12. Consequently, wanted
fertility is clearly adjusted downward. Households invest less in human and physical
capital and output decreases by 14 percent. Therefore, the difference in output per capita
between an economy without any modern control of fertility to another in which there is
perfect control of family size is of about 30 percent. In the model without access to modern
contraceptives or abortion there is lower inequality relative to the benchmark case, which
is due mostly to the reduction of the share of agents acquiring skills. The share of house-
holds in all education categories decreases with the only exception being for the share of
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(a) Fraction of adults by education (b) Fertility by education (c) Unwanted fertility by education
Figure 3: Counterfactual experiments: Extreme cases and baseline.
households without a primary degree, which increases by 60 percent. We also provide a
decomposition of the full effect by shutting down different channels. As before, general
equilibrium effects do not seem to be an important channel, since the model with fixed
input prices yields similar results to the baseline. By assuming that the wanted fertility is
unchanged, we notice that output would decrease even more than in the full experiment.
This is rather intuitive since wanted fertility decreases when modern contraceptives and
abortion are not available. Interestingly, output would rise if we keep the education policy
unchanged. This is because fertility is lower and investment in education is higher in the
benchmark than in the case without fertility control. When the education policy function
is kept as in the baseline, households will decrease wanted fertility even more than in the
full experiment and will also increase savings. Therefore, relative to the baseline, average
years of schooling and physical capital would increase, as well as per capita output.
The following conclusions emerge from these extreme experiments and their decom-
position: (i), although reproductive behaviour is mainly driven by demand as suggested
by many economists (cf., Becker, 1960; Pritchett, 1994), access to modern contraceptives
and abortions indeed shape the distributional pattern of fertility and consequently human
capital dynamics and savings of a society; (ii), family planning interventions can have
sizeable effects on per capita income and seem to improve welfare, in particular of those
households at the lower tail of the income distribution in a developing country like Kenya;
and (iii), there is clearly an upper bound limit on how family planning policy can affect
aggregate outcomes. This is mostly shown in the case of perfect family control (no fertil-
ity risks), since output per capita relative to the baseline increases by at most 13 percent.
While this is indeed a large measure, it is a small fraction of the difference in income levels
between Kenya and more developed or emerging market economies.
6.2 Supply–side Policies
The successful strategy of supply–side family planning policies is to make modern contra-
ceptives accessible to as many women as possible. In our model such policies should affect
the relative price of contraceptives φq. Table 8 reports key statistics relative to the baseline
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for a counterfactual experiment in which households can access modern contraceptives
without any monetary cost (φq = 0). There is still a utility cost Ψq for using them, but
since this estimated utility cost is negligible39 the implication is that now all agents choose
to fully insure against the fertility risk and there is no unwanted pregnancy or abortion.
In this case there is perfect fertility control and effects for this supply-side policy on out-
put, inputs, prices, and inequality are similar to the extreme scenario of no fertility shocks,
which was previously discussed. Output per capita increases by 13 percent. This policy
costs 2.74 percent of the baseline output per capita.40
This supply-side intervention generates a reduction in fertility of 6.86-8.3 percent (de-
pending on whether or not general equilibrium effects are taken into account. see Table
A9 in the companion Online Appendix). As reported previously, such numbers are close
to the estimates reported in empirical literature (see Table 6). The cost per birth averted
corresponds to 7.21 percent of per capita GDP when general equilibrium effects are con-
sidered, and 5.97 percent of per capita GDP when they are not.41
Another supply-side family planning policy is to offer abortions at no cost in public
hospitals and clinics, such that φa = 0. One practical problem with this policy is that
abortion is still considered largely illegal in many countries, including Kenya42 and most
aborted pregnancies are terminated through illegal means. Therefore, before this policy
could be implemented abortion laws in Kenya would first need to be relaxed.
With this caveat in mind, we present results of this experiment in the third column of
Table 8. The percent of pregnancies aborted almost doubles since women reduce their use
of modern contraceptives. Unwanted fertility decreases by 0.5 of a child and total fertility
decreases by 0.30 of a child as a result of this policy. Families adjust their wanted fertility
margin once this policy is implemented.43 Most of the decrease in fertility is in the lower
tail of the education distribution. Average years of schooling for the adult population
rises from 7.68 to 8.46, and there is a 15 percent increase in the level of the capital stock
relative to the baseline. As a result, output per capita increases by 9 percent relative to the
baseline. Inequality decreases, and most of this reduction is due to relative improvements
in the income of households at the lower tail of the income distribution. Given the original
price of abortion, the overall cost of this policy is relatively small. It corresponds to 0.47
percent of the baseline output or about 8 percent of the total expenditure on education
39Ψq = 0.0024 and the average utility in the baseline economy is 3.86.
40This implies a long-run multiplier of government expenditures on output per capita of 4.74.
41In Subsection D.5 of the Online Appendix we also consider the case in which the price of modern con-
traceptives (φq) is heterogenous among the adult population in Kenya. We let the price of contraceptives to
be 10% (but also 30%) higher than the baseline for households with at most 8 years of schooling and 10%
(but also 30%) lower for households with more than 8 years of schooling. The idea behind this heterogene-
ity is that more educated households could not only use modern contraceptives more effectively than less
educated households, but they could also have easier access to them - closeness to hospitals, doctors and
clinics. Results are qualitatively similar to what we observe in Table 8.
42According to Article 26 of the Constitution of Kenya, “Abortion is not permitted unless, in the opinion
of a trained health professional, there is a need for emergency treatment, or the life or health of the mother
is in danger, or if permitted by any other written law.”
43The full effect is decomposed into three different channels (general equilibrium movements, wanted
fertility margin, and education margin) in Table A9 in the companion Online Appendix.
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Table 8: Counterfactual experiments: Supply and demand policies, Kenya 2008
Supply Policies Demand Policies
Statistics Baseline Free Free No disutil. No disutil.
contrac. abortion of contrac. of abortion
Output, input, and prices
Ypc relat. to the baseline 1 1.13 1.09 0.99 1.05
K relat. to the baseline 1 1.21 1.15 0.98 1.09
Av. years of schooling 7.68 8.78 8.46 7.65 8.09
w relat. to the baseline 1 1.04 1.03 0.99 1.02
r relat. to the baseline 1 0.93 0.95 1.01 0.97
Fertility and family planning
Av. fertility 5.54 5.16 5.25 5.58 5.35
Av. unwanted fert. 0.92 0 0.42 0.91 0.51
% of HHs who use contrac. 33 100 12 34 0
% of pregn. aborted 12 0 22 12 23
Av. contrac. exp./wh (%) 0.28 0 0.08 0.28 0
Inequality and welfare
Gini index 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48
Labour income 90/50 3.83 3.89 4 3.83 3.95
Labour income 90/10 12.57 10.89 10.29 12.57 12.16
Welfare 3.86 4.11 4.02 3.85 3.96
Cost of the policy
Cost/Ypc (current Y), (%) 0 2.43 0.43 - -
Cost/Ypc (original Y), (%) 0 2.74 0.47 - -
in Kenya. Therefore, with respect to their effects on output per capita, the free abortion
policy seems to be more cost-effective than the free contraceptive policy.44
There is a limitation in this comparison. When we internally estimated φa we took
into account the unit price of existing abortions in Kenya, but most of these abortions are
taking place in illegal clinics, which can be relatively cheaper than in official providers.
Nevertheless, according to Hussain (2012), international charity Marie Stopes performs
abortions at prices from $25 to $60 in Kenya, and relative to per capita output this cost is in
the range of what our model predicts for such a measure. In Subsection D1 of the Online
Appendix we perform counterfactual policies with higher abortion price. In Subsection
D6 of this Appendix we let the utility cost of abortion (Ψa) to be heterogenous among
the adult population in Kenya. The main idea is that the type of abortion might be very
different for low educated women when compared to highly educated women. Health
and other risks might be higher for low educated women than for high educated women.
44The long-run government expenditures multiplier on output per capita in this case is about 5 times
higher than in the case of free access to contraceptives.
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6.3 Demand–side Policies
Another set of family planning interventions are policies aiming to illustrate the positive
aspects of contraceptives and their efficacy in birth control. Favourable attitudes and be-
haviour toward modern contraceptive methods can be achieved through improvements
in, and greater male involvement with, family planning knowledge. These changes can in
turn be effected through media campaigns and collaboration with community leaders (cf.,
Ashraf, Field, and Lee, 2014). In our model we implement this by reducing the utility cost
of contraceptive use to zero. Table 8 contains some key statistics of such counterfactual
experiments, and Table A10 in the Online Appendix reports the decomposition of the full
effect. Since our estimated utility cost of modern contraceptive use is small,45 we can see
that such demand policies would have limited effects on the share of women using mod-
ern contraceptives and therefore on reproductive behaviour and real economic variables.
We also run another family planning demand policy in which we reduce the utility
cost of abortion. This is a much harder policy to implement in real life: Besides emotional
side effects after an abortion, which may be able to be mitigated through counselling or
other therapeutic help, there can also be adverse physical consequences associated with
it. Therefore, although we think it is worthwhile to execute and report this counterfactual
experiment in our model, we know that it would be difficult to implement it in practice.
However, the utility cost of abortions can also be related to the fact that abortions are
largely illegal in Kenya, as well as to taboos and social stigmas, which can prevent preg-
nant women from seeking abortion facilities. Given that this estimated cost in our model is
much higher than the cost associated with the use of modern contraceptives, the potential
effects on reproductive behaviour and on the economy are stronger for a reduction in the
utility cost of abortion than a reduction in the utility cost of contraceptives. The percentage
of pregnancies terminated when the utility cost of abortion is set at zero doubles relative
to the baseline. Given the relative price of contraceptives, we can observe that no woman
would choose to use modern contraceptives to control family size. They would rely only
on abortion to prevent unwanted births. The average unwanted fertility decreases by 0.4
of a child, and it decreases for all education categories. Realised fertility decreases by 0.19
of a child, which suggests that households adjust wanted fertility upward. Output per
capita increases by 5 percent relative to the baseline and inequality is roughly unchanged.
The decomposition shows that the wanted fertility margin and the investment education
margin are the key channels in driving the overall results.46 For obvious reasons, it is dif-
ficult to price the cost of such demand policies, which explains why we do not report the
costs associated with them, as well as why we will mainly focus on supply–side reforms.
Results are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
Our counterfactual experiments so far with supply and demand family planning inter-
45This might not be the case in other countries. A recent piece from the Economist (2016) shows that in
some countries there are still important barriers preventing couples from using modern contraceptives. For
instance, “Greeks commonly believe that the pill and other hormonal contraceptives cause infertility and
cancer. They also distrust intrauterine devices (IUDs), possibly because they have been taught that tampons
are unhealthy.” As a result, “in Greece abortion is seen as an ordinary form of birth control.”
46See Table A10 in the Online Appendix.
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ventions suggest clearly that there might be room for such policies to affect fertility and
economic outcomes, which is consistent with the micro-level evidence on the impact of
family planning policies on household behaviour (cf., Joshi and Schultz, 2013).
6.4 Birth Control versus Educational Policies
That family planning interventions can bring benefits to those who make use of them and
can generate significant aggregate effects has been shown above. However, policy mak-
ers are faced with a menu of different set of policies to choose from and therefore it is
important to understand the cost-effectiveness of each policy. For instance, governments
might choose to improve access to modern contraceptives and/or invest in education.
The efficacy of family planning policies versus educational policies has long been a topic
of debate in development economics (cf., Pritchett, 1994; Schultz, 2008). Furthermore, not
only is the focus of policies important, but also how they are designed. Policies can be
universal, so that the government subsidises education for all children or distributes con-
traceptives freely to all women; or they can be targeted to specific groups, so that only
relatively poor households receive cash transfers for keeping their children at school, or
only poor women have free access to modern contraceptives. We now provide different
experiments in which we shed some light on this debate.
6.4.1 Universal Policies
There are a variety of different policies which can be introduced in our model but for is-
sues related to their implementability in the real world, we will focus on policies which
either subsidise access to modern contraceptives, or abortion, or subsidise education. In
the first counterfactual policy the government offers a subsidy on the price of modern con-
traceptives to all women.47 The level of this subsidy is such that expenditure on this policy
corresponds to 0.5 percent of income. Some statistics of this policy relative to the baseline
economy are shown in Table 9. The policy is effective in expanding the use of modern
contraceptives since the fraction of women using such methods increases from 33 percent
to 84 percent. Although the average fertility decreases by just 0.10 of a child, the effect of
this policy on unwanted pregnancy is larger since unwanted fertility decreases by 0.34 of
a child48 and abortion is reduced by more than half. Human capital and physical capital
investments rise as expected, and output per capita increases by roughly 2.7 percent. Sub-
sidies for abortion can generate an even stronger effect on output. As shown previously,
free access to abortion for all women would cost about 0.47 of baseline GDP and would
increase output per capita relative to the baseline by 9 percent in the long run. This per
capita output response is about 3.37 times larger than the effect on output per capita of a
subsidy on the price of modern contraceptives
47The National Health Service (NHS) in England offers free modern contraceptives at an affordable cost
to everyone (cf., the Economist, 2016).
48We do not report the decomposition of the full effect but such experiments are available upon request.
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Table 9: Counterfactual experiments: Universal and targeted policies, Kenya 2008. Universal Policies: Sub-
sidy on the price of modern contraceptives; subsidy on the price of abortion; and subsidy on basic education
(0-4 years) for all families. Targeted Policies: Subsidy on the price of modern contraceptives for women with
up to 8 years of schooling; subsidy on the price of abortion for women with up to 8 years of schooling; and
subsidy on basic education for children with parents with up to 8 years of schooling.
Universal Policies Targeted Policies
Parents with up to 8 yrs of sch.
Statistics Baseline Subsid. Subsid. Subsid. Subsid. Subsid. Subsid.
contrac. abortion education contrac. abortion education
(0-4 yrs) (0-4 yrs)
Output, input, and prices
Ypc relat. to the baseline 1 1.027 1.091 0.977 1.025 1.087 1.033
K relat. to the baseline 1 1.04 1.15 0.95 1.04 1.14 1.04
Av. years of schooling 7.68 8.78 8.46 7.84 7.85 8.41 8.36
w relat. to the baseline 1 1.01 1.03 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.01
r relat. to the baseline 1 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.98 0.95 0.99
Fertility and family planning
Av. fertility 5.54 5.44 5.25 5.73 5.45 5.25 5.52
Av. unwanted fert. 0.92 0.58 0.42 0.92 0.63 0.50 0.90
% of HHs who use contrac. 33 84 12 26 73 17 28
% of pregn. aborted 12 5 22 12 5 20 12
Av. contrac. exp./wh (%) 0.28 0.92 0.08 0.22 1.81 0.13 0.24
Inequality and welfare
Gini index 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47
Labour income 90/50 3.83 3.89 4 3.87 3.92 4.00 4.04
Labour income 90/10 12.57 12.21 10.29 12.03 12.21 10.73 12.10
Welfare 3.86 3.91 4.02 3.89 3.90 4.01 3.98
Cost of the policy
Cost/Ypc (current Y), (%) 0 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.50
Cost/Ypc (original Y), (%) 0 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.38 0.52
If the government alternatively funds education so that all children, regardless of fam-
ily income, have access to the first four years of primary education without any direct
private cost, then fertility (due to an income effect) rises substantially by more than a
child. Children become relatively cheaper and parents respond to that by having more
children. Although schooling also rises and inequality decreases, the net effect on out-
put per capita of this policy is negative. In fact, output per capita would decrease if the
government subsidised 4–8 years of education, 8–12 years of education, or 0–12 years of
education. The main driver behind this fall in output is the rise in fertility when primary
or secondary education is universally subsidised. Output per capita only rises when the
government subsidises higher education, but this policy is rather regressive and inequal-
ity rises relative to the baseline. From these policy experiments we can conclude that
universal subsidies in early education are less effective than public investment in modern
contraceptives or abortion to raise per capita income and to control fertility.
The cost-effectiveness of abortion subsidies when compared to the two other policies is
robust to (i) the case when the price of abortion is at the highest range observed in Kenya -
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US$200 instead of US$59 (see Table A13 in the Online Appendix); and (ii) when the utility
cost of abortion is 30% higher relative to the baseline for households with up to 8 years of
schooling and 30% lower relative to the baseline for households with more than 8 years of
schooling (see Table A18 in the Online Appendix).
6.4.2 Targeted Policies
Now we focus our analysis on targeted policies. Table 9 reports results for three different
targeted policies: a subsidy on the price of modern contraceptives for women with up to 8
years of schooling (a primary degree); a subsidy on the price of abortion for women with
up to 8 years of schooling (a primary degree); and a subsidy on basic education (0-4 years)
for the children of the parents with up to 8 years of schooling (a primary degree).49 The
policy would cost up to 0.5 percent of GDP.
A targeted subsidy on the price of modern contraceptives for women with up to 8
years of schooling (a primary degree) increases the share of women using such contra-
ceptive methods, but by less than the universal policy reported previously. The fraction
of women using modern contraceptives increases from 33 percent to 70 percent with this
policy, but it jumps to 84 percent when the universal policy is implemented. Addition-
ally, average wanted fertility decreases by about 0.09 of a child and the average unwanted
fertility by 0.29 of a child. Investment in human and physical capital rise and output per
capita increases by roughly 2.5 percent. These numbers are bit less than in the universal
policy, which is explained by the fact that in the baseline equilibrium there are also un-
wanted pregnancies among women with a secondary or a higher degree and a universal
policy would increase the intensity of modern contraceptive use for all women, and not
only those at the lower tail of the human capital distribution.
Making abortion free for women with up to 8 years of schooling would cost 0.38 per-
cent of baseline output. Compared to the subsidy on modern contraceptive prices for
women with the same amount of schooling, the abortion subsidy is much more effective in
reducing unwanted fertility and total fertility, and consequently on increasing investment
in human and physical capital. This subsidy increases output per capita by 8.7 percent
relative to the baseline or about 3.24 times the increase in output per capita when the use
of modern contraceptives is subsidised for women with the same amount of schooling.
Finally, the last column of Table 9 reports results for the experiment in which basic ed-
ucation (0–4 years) is subsidised for all children of parents with up to 8 years of schooling.
Educational attainment increases, and output per capita relative to the baseline increases
by 3.3 percent. Average realised and unwanted fertility are roughly unchanged. Relative
to the other two targeted policies, this targeted subsidy on education generates a larger
impact on output per capita than the subsidy on the price of modern contraceptives, but
smaller effect on income per capita when abortion is subsidised. This ranking of poli-
cies by their effectiveness to increase income is robust to when price of abortion is in the
49We report results for this target group because it is the one in which the subsidy on education generates
the largest positive effect on per capita income. Table A14 in the Online Appendix contains results with
policies which target women with up to 4 years of schooling.
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higher range observed in the data and when the utility cost of abortion is higher for poorer
households than for households with higher levels of education.
There are many health complications associated with abortion, which vary signifi-
cantly with the stage at which the pregnancy is stopped and these might not be fully
captured in our model. In addition, official providers in developing countries such as
Kenya might not have the facilities, medical specialists and medicines needed in order to
scale the level of abortions generated in our experiments. Our experiments just suggest
that countries should think about their legal law on abortion and whether or not to pro-
vide them in official providers. As discussed previously, in many countries abortion is
not permitted by law but still several women undergo unsafe abortions each year. Our
experiments also show that contraceptive policies seem to be an effective strategy to not
only increase living standard but to also decrease abortions.
6.5 Ghana
In order to verify whether or not our model fit and results are specific to the choice of
Kenya as the baseline economy, we also estimate model parameters such that we match
micro and macro moments of Ghana for 2008. We apply a similar strategy and consider the
same moments used in the case of Kenya. Income per capita in Ghana is 40 percent higher
than in Kenya and there are other important differences between these two economies.
For instance, the abortion rate is higher in Ghana than in Kenya. While abortion in Kenya
is prohibited by its Constitution unless the life and health of an expectant mother is in
danger, abortion in Ghana is legally permissible.50
Table A15 and A16 in the Online Appendix report the calibrated and estimated param-
eter values that result from the baseline estimation procedure applied to Ghana and the
model fit, respectively. For the sake of space we do not report them here. The model does
a better job in reproducing the fertility (wanted and unwanted) behaviour for Ghana than
for the case of Kenya. Interestingly, the utility abortion cost is estimated to be approxi-
mately half of value estimated for Kenya (Ψa = 0.0422 for Ghana instead of Ψa = 0.0804).
Table 10 reports key statistics relative to the Ghana baseline for a couple of counterfac-
tual experiments. In the first (No fertility shocks) experiment we consider the case in which
households can perfectly control family size. Unwanted fertility goes down to 0 and the
average fertility goes down by about 0.3 of a child, i.e., total fertility is reduced by approx-
imately 8 percent. This is very close to what we observed to the case of Kenya in which
fertility was reduced by 7 percent. Notice that output increases by 10 percent relative to
the baseline. It increased by 13 percent in the case of Kenya.
In the second extreme experiment households can control fertility by only adjusting
wanted fertility. The average fertility increases by 1.3 of a child relative to the baseline,
while unwanted fertility increases from 0.55 to 2.39. Output decreases by 28 percent. The
difference in output per capita between an economy without any modern control of fertil-
ity to another in which there is perfect control of family size is approximately 38 percent.
50Countries Where Abortion Is Illegal Population. Retrieved 2019-09-09, from
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-where-abortion-is-illegal/
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Table 10: Counterfactual experiments: Extreme cases and supply policies, Ghana 2008
Extreme cases Supply Policies
Statistics Baseline No fertility No family Free Free
shocks planning contrac. abortion
Output, input, and prices
Ypc relat. to the baseline 1 1.10 0.72 1.10 1.06
K relat. to the baseline 1 1.21 0.55 1.21 1.13
Av. years of schooling 7.34 8.25 5.31 8.25 7.98
w relat. to the baseline 1 1.05 0.86 1.05 1.03
r relat. to the baseline 1 0.91 1.31 0.91 0.94
Fertility and family planning
Av. fertility 3.66 3.36 4.94 3.36 3.47
Av. unwanted fert. 0.55 0 2.39 0 0.20
% of HHs who use contrac. 16 0 0 100 8
% of pregn. aborted 30 0 0 0 37
Av. contrac. exp./wh (%) 0.14 0 0 0 0.04
Inequality and welfare
Gini index 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51
Labor income 90/50 3.51 3.32 3.59 3.32 3.33
Labor income 90/10 16.04 15.93 15.56 15.93 14.25
Welfare 4.73 4.90 4.31 4.89 4.83
Cost of the policy
Cost/Ypc (current Y), (%) 0 0 0 2.07 0.25
Cost/Ypc (original Y), (%) 0 0 0 2.29 0.27
This difference is about 8 percentage points larger than the case observed for Kenya.
Table 10 also reports statistics for a counterfactual experiment in which households
can access modern contraceptives without any monetary cost. There is still a utility cost
for using them. As in the case of Kenya, the estimated utility cost is negligible and all
agents choose to fully insure against the fertility risk. There is no unwanted pregnancy or
abortion. Therefore, results are similar to the case of perfect fertility control. The cost of
this policy is 2.29 percent of the baseline output, which implies a long-run multiplier of
government expenditures on output per capita of 4.36.
We also implement a family planning policy to offer abortions at no cost in public
hospitals and clinics, such that φa is equal to zero. Output per capita increases by 6 percent
relative to the baseline. The overall cost of this policy is relatively small. It corresponds to
approximately 0.27 percent of the baseline output. The long-run government expenditures
multiplier on output per capita in this case is about 5 times higher than in the case of free
access to contraceptives. This difference is similar to the one observed for Kenya.
Finally, instead of calibrating and estimating model parameters to different economies,
which is computationally demanding and time consuming, we also create the following
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counterfactual economies: (i) we adjust the total factor productivity parameter A of Equa-
tion (1) such that the counterfactual economy has a relative (to Kenya) per capita income
similar to what is observed in the data for some reference economies; and (ii) in the spirit
of de la Croix and Doepke (2003), we also adjust proportionally the cost of education λ(e),
such that the cost of education relative to income per capita remains unchanged. The idea
is that teachers’ salary should be positively related to per capita income. The value of
the other parameters are kept at the level estimated for Kenya. There are 9 counterfac-
tual economies based on income data from Congo, Ghana, Egypt, Liberia, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The poorest economy in this sam-
ple is Liberia. Its per capita income is 38 percent of the the level observed in Kenya. The
richest economy is Egypt, which is approximately 4 times richer than Kenya.
Subsection D4 of the Online Appendix provides the effects of two family planning
interventions using these counterfactual economies. The two interventions are: (a) Exper-
iment in which the price of modern contraceptives is zero (φq = 0); and (b) there is no
monetary cost of abortion (φa = 0). Clearly, the effects of supply-side family planning
policies on aggregate variables such as income per capita, average years of schooling and
the average fertility rate are decreasing with income levels. This is expected since for these
counterfactual economies we are keeping the cost of modern contraceptives and abor-
tion at the level observed in Kenya. Therefore, for economies with higher TFP, modern
contraceptives and abortion are relatively more affordable. Free modern contraceptives
(abortion) increase(s) income per capita in approximately 17% (24%) in the counterfactual
economy with GDP per capita similar to the one observed in Liberia and 4% (3%) in the
counterfactual economy with GDP per capita similar to the one observed in Egypt. Recall
that even when the aggregate effects are small, family planning interventions might have
important distributional impacts on fertility and human capital formation.
7 Conclusions
The role of family planning policies in endogenously affecting fertility, savings, human
capital investment, and income per capita levels has not been explored in the macro lit-
erature. Conventional macroeconomics wisdom ascribes family size to demand or the
quantity-quality trade-off, which implies that family planning interventions should not
have major impact on the economy (cf., Pritchett, 1994). This view has a major short-
coming: micro development literature shows that improving knowledge and access to
modern contraceptives, and legalising abortion can have important effects on individual
outcomes (cf., May, 2012). Our paper contributes to the existing literature by embedding
endogenously unwanted fertility in a standard quantity-quality overlapping generations
model of population and growth with heterogenous households. Our model has several
novel characteristics: Fertility control is costly and families can (partially) insure against a
fertility risk by using costly contraception. Households can opt to abort some unwanted
pregnancies, at a cost. Given the number of children born, parents decide how much edu-
cation to provide and how much to save out of their young adulthood income. The model
36
is calibrated and estimated to match key empirical moments of the economy of Kenya.
We show that the standard macro view that family size is determined by demand is
in part correct since aggregate fertility is mainly driven by desired family size. The dif-
ference between the fertility rate of our baseline (2008 Kenyan economy) model, in which
fertility is costly controlled, and a model in which fertility is fully controlled through cost-
less contraceptives is just 0.4 of a child. However, access to modern contraceptives and
abortion shapes the compositional pattern of fertility and consequently, the human capital
dynamics and savings of a society, and family planning interventions can have sizeable ef-
fects on individual outcomes and aggregate variables. The average fertility measure hides
important distributional issues since the gap between realised and wanted fertility can be
three times larger for low–income families than high–income families. Our counterfactual
exercises show that if modern contraceptive methods are freely provided to all women,
then output per capita would increase by 13 percent relative to the baseline economy, and
that would cost about 2.43 of GDP. Interestingly, our results suggest that with a small
government budget (say, up to 0.5 percent of GDP), family planning interventions might
be more cost-effective in improving long-run living standards than polices that subsidise
education. In practice, family planning interventions might be also more effective when
integrated to raise awareness about contraceptives and to change social norms through
education (sexual education) polices.
Our fertility model can be applied to investigate important unresolved questions such
as the role of access to modern contraceptives in affecting structural transformation, fe-
male labor force participation, and social security. Future research can potentially address
these and other related questions.
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